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英文原文如下：

The Spectator: Zhou Bo, welcome to Chinese Whispers. Now, China's position has often been criticized in the west for being too supportive of Russia. What's your understanding of China's position on the war?

Zhou Bo: I think, as a comment on China Russian relationship, it’s really not said in the West that if you look at this most important relationship in the world, just like China US relationship, you have to put it first of all on a bilateral context. And if you put that in bilateral context, you would know that China is Russia's largest neighbor and vice versa. The problem with China now is that China, because of its weight and heft, is actually associated with everything that doesn't seem to have anything to do with China. And this is the price you have to pay as a great power. And because of the war in Ukraine, of course, and because of the China Russia's good relationship, definitely people would ask a question about this relationship that makes a lot of sense.

But on this Russia Ukrainian war, I think China has already contributed a lot, at least on two issues that are basically underappreciated in the west, as I have written in Financial Times a few days ago. First of all, China didn't throw wood into the fire. Well, this may just sound somewhat empty, but think of China's weight and think of China's military. If China joins Russia, this is already the dawn of the Third World War. So people have to realize that how China actually has contributed to peace in Europe, by not picking a side. Then the second thing is China has made it crystal clear that we are against any possible use of nuclear weapons in Europe. I first wrote on this that was published in FT. When President Xi Jinping met with Olaf Shultz, the German chancellor, he reiterated this firm decade old Chinese policy, which was reiterated during his meeting with Joe Biden at G20.

So far, we have made two distinctive contributions for peace in Europe. And then China, of course, is going to do more. And people talk about China's possibility of providing lethal military support to Russia, which is totally impossible because that doesn't make any sense. If China does, of course, it won't go unnoticed. And why should China do that when China actually is tabling a peace proposal for resolution of the conflict?

The Spectator: On the question of lethal aid, some people would say that if American intelligence is so confident that China is considering this, that kind of affords it an authority, a trustedness in this kind of intelligence, even though we haven't seen it ourselves. How can you say for sure that China is not considering it?

Zhou Bo: Because it's not in China's own interests. The question is, why should China be dragged into a conflict that is far away from China, which is between Russia, one of the strongest nation on earth, and Ukraine, which has China as its largest trading partner. And this is an unprecedented war in the heart of Europe. And why should China pick a side and get yourself involved? It doesn't make any sense.

The Spectator: So, you've mentioned that this is a question that makes sense to ask of China because China is now a global player. And we talk about America being this global policeman, and China is clearly wanting to take more responsibilities in the world now that it's the second largest economy. But you then say it doesn't want to take sides in this war. I mean, isn't it shirking its responsibilities as a global player?

Zhou Bo: China is different from a small country in that a small country would probably consider more about itself and its ambience, right? And its military would simply want to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. China is no exception. But China as a major power has two things more. One is it has global economic interests that it has to safeguard. Besides, great power shoulders great responsibility. Therefore, China also shoulders a greater responsibility. China has to safeguard its own sovereignty and territory integrity, which is unusual for a major power like China because China has not become reunified. But at the same time, it has to also consider something else, that is how to defend its overseas interest and how to shoulder these great international responsibilities. But in terms of security, China's primary concern is still about his doorsteps, that is South China Sea, that is Taiwan Strait, all these kinds of issues. So if you know how China has been concerned with all these issues, which are becoming more and more suffice with what we perceive to be foreign interferences, you would understand China should have no interest whatsoever to be involved in a war far away in Europe.

The Spectator: The lengthy border between China and Russia at the moment I understand is the least militarized it has been in decades. And is that part of the reason why China doesn't want to make an enemy of Russia as well?

Zhou Bo: You see, neighbors won't move away. So this is just the reality, both for China and for Russia. And we are just the largest neighbor to each other. And because of the not necessarily all pleasant history, China now with its border issue totally resolved with Russia, should have all reasons to maintain this good neighbor policy with Russia. And they would think likewise, I believe. That's what I said in the beginning. When people think about relationship, mostly they think they would put it in a different context and would look at it through third eye. But if you look at this relationship, either by Chinese or by Russians, they know this is the priority, that we must remain friendly with this biggest neighbor. And this is about the foreign policy. And in terms of practicalities, there are also so many things that we should consider because even in the long run, Russia would be useful for China economically and vice versa. So there are huge interests.

Right now, I think the west is somewhat biased because the war in the heart of Europe, they would just examine this relationship from a kind of western context, which automatically would become somewhat biased.

The Spectator: Now, you mentioned the peace plan that China has recently released. The first point of the peace plan is respect for sovereignty, something that you've also mentioned so far. In light of all of these different interests and reasons to be friendly with Russia, isn't it the case that sovereignty has taken a back seat when it comes to China's foreign policy? China has always talked about sovereignty as an important part of its foreign policy. I understood that respect for sovereignty as a legacy of our brutalized recent history. But now it feels pretty empty when a sovereign nation is being invaded and China won't do anything about it.

Zhou Bo: No, I don't think China's proposal is empty, because ever since day one when this war came out, China has been talking about two sides of the same coin. The only thing is, I think the West has become kind of selectively blind towards the two sides of the same coin, because they talked about how China has not been crystal clear about this war being an invasion. But when China talks about respect for sovereignty, we actually have gently criticized Russia. But because China's relationship with Russia is friendly, so we did not put it out so bluntly. But this attitude about respect of sovereignty is talked about in the very beginning and it could not be misunderstood. But on the other hand, we do have some sympathies toward Russia as to why this war just came out, because ever since Soviet Union, soviet leader like Gorbachev down to Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and President Putin have invariably warned against such NATO expansions.

NATO from time pledged not to expand, but it didn't actually keep this promise. And I have a reason why this has happened, because military alliances basically live on so called threats. They need threats to survive and to thrive. And for such juggernauts like NATO, it did not go away with the end of the Cold War. Instead, it wants to expand. Therefore, it has to have a big threat to justify its own existence. It's not about counter terrorism, these kinds of things, petty small things that are useful, but not totally useful for such big military bloc. So they need something bigger, which has to be Russia because who looks most like Soviet Union? Russia is not the Soviet Union, but of course, Russia looks most like Soviet Union. So in this regard, this turned out to be the reality. They have been turning the deaf ear to whatever warnings from Russia, probably they're just a bit too arrogant because they have won the Cold War.

Then come this concept of sphere of influence, it of course is a dirty word, nobody would really talk about it openly. But if Russia believes there is sphere of influence, if Russia believes Ukrainian are really one people, you can imagine how they feel. So if Russia would like to defend its sphere of influence with arms, with forces, then the conclusion is, for Russia, there is sphere of influence. So right now the west just talk about what is happening on the soil of Ukraine. Of course, everybody understand war is cruel, but without referring to the very causes, why it happened at all, there is no security in Europe, because in Europe the security architecture actually stands only on compromises between Russia and NATO, and even in the future, it would be something like this. NATO can say, NATO is not forcing any country to join and all countries to be not afraid of Russia would volunteer to join. These are totally true. That is correct. But with this kind of expansion makes Russia extremely uncomfortable. And to some extent, NATO has actually driven itself to the threshold of a nuclear war. So this is a zombie that is still walking. This is not a brain dead as Macron said, I described as a zombie that is walking. So right now, this is what is happening in Europe. You have to find a compromise with Russia, like it or not. Otherwise, you will always live in fear, in panic.

The Spectator: Well, Zhou Bo, isn't your version of history of NATO a little bit one sided by the sense that, I mean, it's not just the west that still sees Russia as the USSR, it seems that some people in Russia still see themselves or want to go back to the glory days of the Soviet Union. And then they put themselves against the west as a kind of counter. Some people in the west would say if Russia were to democratize, if Russia were to respect sovereignty, then it would very well much be welcomed into NATO itself. Russia is not necessarily the enemy, but Russia as it is at the moment is, I mean, it isn't that part of what has been brought on by how Russia has been governed since the fall of the Soviet Union as well, especially under Putin?

Zhou Bo: I think you're right in that Russia is not totally justifiable in the attitude toward the international order, for example, because I believe Russia would look to the future from the past. And that is the problem with Russia. Russia's nostalgic, Putin talked about the heydays of the Soviet Union and he talked about what is the use of the world without Russia. And then in my opinion that was publishing the FT, I ask this question, and where is Russia without the world? If you use nuclear weapon, where is the world? And then where is Russia? That's a problem. So I believe this kind of mentality of Russia being a great power is deeply embedded in Russian people's mentality. And probably this kind of dissolution of Soviet Union has actually add to this kind of acrimony.

But then let's talk about something else, about international order. When people at this Munich security conference, which I attended recently, the basic conclusion is totally wrong, and it cannot be more wrong, because according to the report, Munich Conference, the conclusion is that on one side is China, Russia, two autocratic revisionist and then on the other side is western democracy. And the conclusion is China and Russia are challenging international order and the west, yes, has also met some problems, that is, it has not pay enough attention to the countries in the global south. Therefore, we should do something to improve ourselves.

But this kind of basic conclusion is wrong. China's attitude toward international order is different from Russia's because China has benefited from interacting with the west since reform and opening up. So China's tremendous achievements is because it is ready to learn. It is ready to integrate itself with the rest of the world, including the west. But the problem with western mentality is that it is narcissistic, because it believes the international order after Second World War is just Liberal international order. This is totally wrong. Why? Because we must admit that whenever we live, there is something like order and this order may be balanced or imbalanced somewhere but there is an order. But the question is how do we define this order? The order itself, in my opinion is made of different legs: first it is composed of different social systems, different religions, different cultures, different national identities and some of these may just have lasted for millenniums, this identity of a nation. So this kind of thing, some of them are very static, they're not so volatile.

The second layer is the major events that have constantly shape this international order, for example after second world war, you can imagine how many major events have occurred. We're not talking about some small things. We’re talking about the Independent movement of Africa continent, which include 53 countries. The independence of 53 countries is no small thing. Then there was also the rivalry of two camps led by NATO on one side and Warsaw Pact on the other side. So even talking about this, how do you know that the order of the Second World War is totally liberal international order? Are you so ignorant? And then how about the rise of China? This all happened after Second World War. So these major events have shaped this order. And the problem with the west is that it believes that the economic rules and regimes and some of the constitutions it has helped to established are the international order, which for me are just a part of the world but not the whole world.

The Spectator: So you see a much more diverse environment of different national cultures, political cultures, that liberalism is just one strand of that, the western strand. But internationally, there are other political cultures that have always existed since World War Two.

Zhou Bo: Yeah, but the danger of this kind of western belief is that if you believe in the Liberal international order, actually it hurts yourself because you become narcissist, and because if you believe democracy is no longer thriving as found by Freedom House, ever since 2006, western democracy has been declining. So you start to blame other countries, because you believe you're the right one, because you believe you're the one holding the Liberal international order. And you find that the world is not moving this way, and the world in the future is not moving this way. So you become frustrated and you start to look around. And then you find China and Russia to blame. But China, Russia are still different.

The Spectator: I wonder if that almost universalist view of the world that the west holds about liberalism is partly why it fears so much China's rise, in that it believes that there's a Liberal order ruling the world after, let's say, the Cold War. And so if anyone's going to challenge that Liberal order, then their order would also be universalist. But are you saying that if China were to be the world superpower, it were to overtake the US, what the Chinese see is actually more of a multipolar world rather than a Chinese led authoritarian world order. I think that's a large part of the fear of western countries about China's rise.

Zhou Bo: I think that is true, because China never propose to have a unipolar world. China never talks like the United States that it a city upon the hill. China never said like Madeleine Albright that United States is indispensable，either. China never talked in that way. China always says that, okay, because this involves everybody, let's do it together. And China talks about the humanity of shared future. This grandiose concept of president Xi Jinping right now has three pillars under it. One is a global security initiative; another is global development initiative and the third one is global civilization initiative. Some critics say that these are very general principles without details. They’re wrong. Why? Let me tell you, under the global development initiative, we have already seen Belt and Road initiative, which is totally tangible because this has only a history of 10 years. Ten years ago, few people know what it means. But in 10 years, this becomes international phrase that almost all educated people know. So this is not empty idea. We have spent billions or trillions of dollars in it. It's not an empty idea. So that's why I talk to some people who say this is Chinese trap. I said, okay, would you spend trillions of dollars to lay a trap? Would you do that?

Then about Global Security Initiative, we also have something under it net that is a place operation overseas. Right now there are three types of operations by PLA overseas, that is counterpiracy, that is peacekeeping and that is disaster relief. But if you put all these operational altogether, they have a common name. Professionally speaking, it is a military operation other than war, what we called MOOTW. But these operations are just humanitarian in nature. For example, in counterpiracy in Gulf of Aden, we dispel pirates. We apprehended piracy, but we didn't try to kill them. We do not want to kill anyone. And so far overseas, China has not killed anyone. And we are extremely cautious in behaving like that. And this would come into such a sharp contrast with NATO, with the US activities, military operation overseas. How many people have been killed or injured purposefully or inadvertently by these operations?

The Spectator: Don’t you think that's just a matter of time in the sense that in the timeline of China and the US being superpowers, the US has had 100 years head start, let's say since the beginning of the 20th century. Whereas China, as you say, only really from reform and opening has it become a strong country internationally, and it is still a work in progress. So, of course, its army hasn't been going out there being the global policeman because it hasn't had needed to, hasn't had the money to do so. But are you really telling me that as China gets stronger, that it wouldn't consider killing people in Taiwan if it were to take military action over Taiwan? I mean, some people are talking about the Indian border would point to the soldiers who are hurt and killed by Chinese soldiers. I mean, isn't it just that China hasn't had that kind of role so far, but that doesn't mean it won't have it in the future.

Zhou Bo: Well, this is my best hope for China in the future. And I believe it is still possible. Nobody can say for sure that China would really behave like a pacifist without any killing in the future. But history may just give us some guidance, that is China's rise is very peaceful indeed if you compare it with some other countries. So let's talk about the border clash between China and India. Even if this clash has claimed the life of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. This is deadly brawl. That means we did not try to shoot at each other. So that means in 21st century, the troops of China and India are fighting in a manner only found in Stone Age. And why is that? Because both sides subconscious know that they should not shoot at each other in any circumstances. The Indian soldiers did shoot into the sky to give a kind of warning, but so far we have not been shooting at each other. So this is true, and this is almost the only example that you can find in the kind of clashes.

And then about the Taiwan issue, this is, of course, needless to say, this is a domestic issue. But I genuinely believe that we have uttermost sincerity and would make utmost efforts to try to get reunified peacefully, because what is the use of Taiwan that totally battered and shattered for us, let alone there are so many people on the island. So the cost would be too high for us.

The Spectator: But as I understand it, President Xi hasn't talked to President Cai since she was elected in 2016.

Zhou Bo: That is true. But then come this question, why would President Xi talk to, Ma Ying-jeou, Cai's predecessor and not to her? Because we in mainland believe Ma Ying-jeou did not give a timetable for reunification. Mainland did not give out timetable for reunification. But we in the mainland are somewhat confident that Ma Ying-jeou still agree to this kind of a general concept of Taiwan being part of one China. So we have some confidence in him. So that is why we know, we don't know when we could become reunited, but we know so long as we walk down the road, one day, we can become still a big family. This is our confidence. So we're not that much worried. Therefore, we give Ma Ying-jeou’s authority a lot of preferential economic benefits. And we did not try to disturb Taiwan's diplomatic relationship with about a dozen countries. But Cai, of course, is, it is a totally different story. And we don't have confidence in her either at all.

The Spectator: But it's not just the question of her, right? I mean, she was elected twice. And I think there is increasing public opinion in Taiwan that doesn't want to become a part of the People's Republic of China. Part of that, in this greater context, what do you think of how China has dealt with Hong Kong? Not least because of the Hong Kong people who've moved to Taiwan in general after the National Security Law. But Taiwan can see what one country, two systems turns into. So why would it want to be a part of that? I mean, hasn't China kind of messed this one up?

Zhou Bo: I think it is also true that Taiwan has benefited hugely from economic interaction with mainland. And there are so many Taiwanese living in China, for example, in Shanghai, it's a huge number. I don't know exactly how many people live in the mainland, but sometimes people would talk about 1.5 million. I don't know. So when that figure was raised, I was thinking about this, probably a lot of people above middle class in Taiwan actually live in China. So these people of course should be middle class at least. Otherwise they cannot not afford to live in Shanghai. So that means in Shanghai, their lives are very comfortable. I once talk to a Frenchman and he said that there are probably 100,000 Frenchmen living in Shanghai alone. So that means this kind of a difference in social system doesn't really matter to them. Besides, we actually would make this kind of conditions for reunification quite tolerant for Taiwanese, I believe, because the central government has put forward a number of measures as proposals. And then, of course, this kind of things are always negotiable. And we have expressed time again that these kind of things are negotiable. But for Taiwan to be separated from mainland, this is not affordable for us.

Zhou Bo: I think it has a lot of things to do with education, because Taiwan has been separated from mainland for so long. And if all these voices are promoting a kind of independence.

But I'm also thinking about this issue. For example, it won't be too long before China becomes the largest economy in the world. Some people talked about 2028 in Britain, before pandemic. So that is the most optimistic forecast. Now people seems to be less optimistic given China's aging population and apparent slowdown economy. But I would believe, even if we take a few years more, this is still achievable. Then wouldn't that be a turning point in changing the mentality of Taiwanese people, if they consider themselves to be part of the strongest national on earth, wouldn't that change the mentality? Some people won't be changed for any reasons, but then there is, there is a possibility for them to change the mentality. And besides, on this issue, it's not only what Taiwanese would think about, it’s also about what the mainlanders would think about these two parts of being one China that also matters.

The Spectator: What do you mean by that?

Zhou Bo: I mean, the future of Taiwan is not only determined by Taiwanese, it is also determined by mainlanders because we believe Taiwan is part of China. So it's not only they can decide on their own future, it's that mainland could also decide on the future of Taiwan.

The Spectator: Your point about economics is really interesting because it's something that I've heard a lot from speaking to Chinese interlocutors about Hong Kong and about Taiwan, that so much is placed on the material goods of a better economy, of a stronger country, all of these sort of things, and very little is put on to a pursuit of values like democracy, freedom of speech, which then the answer becomes was one about education, as you've said today. Why would Taiwan care about China being the world's largest economy if it doesn't currently care now, and when Taiwan as a, you might not call it a country, but Taiwan as a set of islands is economically doing very well in all sorts of areas, I just don't know if—— I think it betrays a particularly materialistic view of the world that I think a lot of people in Beijing have, which I think is fascinating.

The Spectator: I want to bring this back to the Russia Ukraine war. But before I do, just one final question on Taiwan, which is that, what do you think is the possibility of military action over Taiwan from China in terms of an invasion? I mean, some American military sources have said it's before 2025, for example. You're someone with links to the military. I mean, what do you think about that? And what would be the threshold if not a timeline, then what would be the threshold that you think China would decide that peaceful reunification is not possible and therefore, this is the moment.

Zhou Bo: Your question that raise a few good points. First of all, I know who you're referring to, that is Americans four-star general Mike Minihan, who was the commander of Americans air Mobility Command, he said something like that. But the question is, even his superior Pentagon didn't agree with him. And Pentagon pointed out that his remarks are not in accordance with assessment of the Pentagon. So I have a lot of questions for his remarks. First of all, it is fine if someone has his gut feeling, right, we all have our own gut feeling on something. But how come that you would say something that is so consequential based on your gut feeling and you would send it in a memo to your subordinates? This is very weird for me because I have read all the media report on his remarks, but I could not find any statistics supporting his argument. And this kind of gut feeling is really horrendous.

And it tells me something about the difficulties in China US relationship, that is how a divided American domestic policy could actually bring chaos to its foreign policy. People don't often talk about that, but definitely foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics. And right now in the United States, even as outsiders, we are worried to see how the United States is becoming so domestically divided because this would create a problem for us. You see, this kind of division is manifested at different layers. It is between or among the three branches. It is within the military itself, just like the remarks of a general in disagreement with his superior. And it is found of apparently between the legislative branch and the executive branch. For example, like Nancy Pelosi's visit, Biden didn't like it, Pentagon didn't like it. But still, she went there, so all these things put together would actually create a lot of problems. And Biden himself is a weak President, frankly speaking. So putting all this together, it is extremely difficult to manage this relationship. That is a big challenge for us.

And then coming back to your questions about how likely a military attack is。In our anti-secession law, we have made it clear that this kind of non-peaceful means of resolving the Taiwan issue by mainland could only occur in three situations. One is that Taiwan would declare independence. This doesn't look possible. They're not so stupid to do that. The second thing is major events leading to the separation of Taiwan from mainland. I try to think hard about what this kind of events might be. And I would consider Nancy Pelosi’s a visit might be in this category.

The third situation is that mainland believe that the prospect for peaceful reunification is exhausted for good. So about this last point, my advice is that you have to let Chinese Mainland believe we can still reach peaceful reunification with Taiwan, so this won't happen. And for us to believe there is a peace to be maintained, as we often say in peacekeeping, right? For us in peacekeeping, we have to make sure that there is peace to be kept. And for us to believe that there is a peace to be kept across Taiwan Strait, then the question is, what United States should do? All these kind of signals sending to China, send to Taiwan are not conflicting, they're totally confusing, they're totally irresponsible. I think it is true that neither China nor the United States wants to have a conflict. But the problem is, first of all, we have to reach agreement on the instruments, through what channels could we actually try to maintain this relationship to make it as peaceful as possible? Second, what are the genuine issues that could actually destabilize this relationship? Two steps that we might slide into conflict. So all these things together, I don't believe we right now have an agreement on this, so you're saying the tones actually rising higher and higher, this is not healthy, but raises as a question, who is more responsible for this?

The Spectator: In your second and third points about those conditions for a military action, I mean, they're pretty big categories, they're really big categories. If Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan can be seen is a step towards Taiwan being separated from Chinese Mainland, then I think the bar is very low for something to count in that category. What I didn't understand when that was happening last year was, why Beijing couldn't say, we welcome Speaker Pelosi to our beautiful province of Taiwan, please come see us and do come into the mainland as well. You know, this kind of going head to head in a very strong way, instead of using slightly more diplomacy would I consider as Chinese deftness in cultural senses. Why isn't more of that being used when it comes to the problem over the strait? You know, why does a Pelosi visit have to become such a big deal, which I think partly was made such a big deal by Beijing's reaction.

Zhou Bo: There are some people in the west who have argued like you and I believe there are, of course, a number reason for that. The Chinese Mainland believes Taiwan is part of China. For the central government, you cannot go there to visit someone without my permission. And because this cross-strait relationship is so sour, there is no possibility for what you have described beautifully. So it is impossible at this stage.

The Spectator: And I want to bring us back to the Russian invasion because China has proposed this peace plan that we've been talking about. But if it really cares about peace, shouldn't it do more about that than just talk about it?

Zhou Bo: I think we'll have to be patient. Patience is really a virtue of Chinese. And so you, when you think about the Chinese mentality, you also got to bear this in mind. Let me give you two examples. One is China's reform and opening up. China didn't have a roadmap. But Chinese, I believe so far, can be said to be good at finding the road without a map, because the reform and opening up, they didn't have a map. And there is no such a map how you can shake off poverty of 800 million people within four decades. There is no roadmap. And we did it. And then about this Belt and Road Initiative which I mention just now, 10 years ago, what was it? In a nutshell, nobody understood it. But in 10 years' time, you see how it actually proliferated into so many things, so tangible around the world.

So, I believe China's role in this Russia Ukrainian war, firstly is a genuine step forward in a constructive way. Because in the past, China's position is more kind of nuanced neutrality. But putting forward this peace plan itself is a major step forward. And Chinese thinking is always think about some big concepts to lay out the structure first before fulfilling it with concrete bricks, for example, and so forth. Then you come to think about the China's role first in the six Party talks, which is on the denuclearization in Korean Peninsula and China's role in the Iranian nuclear issue, which is called JCPOA. So in the first example, China basically is the de facto leader, coordinating all the parties together. So China played a very significant role. And then in JCPOA, China is just an equal participant. China role is not bigger than the one in the six party talks. So China have different ways of playing its role.

But on this issue, the conflict in Europe, China has a unique advantage, that is China's good relation with Russia. If Russia would like to listen to anyone, most probably it is China now. So China has a lot of potentials to play. And this war would not finish very soon. So I believe, in the days to come, because in part the world is looking up to China all the more, so long as the war drags on, people would simply have more expectation for China to play positive role. And this kind of expectation can sometime become the pressure for China to do more. So there is no going back. China has already made a constructive step forward and I believe there would be second or third steps to come.

But then the question is, what can China do? It's not really a question of what China can do. China cannot do anything right now because no one would like to see a ceasefire, be it Russia, Ukraine, or the United States. So if we talk about peace, the first step, of course, is ceasefire. But none of these countries now want to ceasefire. So China can only help when these countries decide to have a ceasefire, right? And it's not only China that is helping. There might be other countries who wants to help. So China can only jump in at a time that is most appropriate.

The Spectator: There's also been this announcement around AUKUS, where the British prime minister has stepped on the podium with the American president and the Australian prime minister to talk about what this deal could look like. Now, they didn't mention China much, but it's clearly got China in mind. So I wondered, from your perspective, what does the view look like on AUKUS from Beijing?

Zhou Bo: AUKUS is definitely against China, because otherwise you cannot explain why Australia would need nuclear power submarines. Just give you a scenario. If China and Australia have a conflict, where can it be? It cannot be in the waters of Australia, right? We have no purposes whatsoever against Australia, and our strategic focus is not in that direction. It can only be in South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait or near Taiwan Strait. That means their ships would come close to China. This is the only logical conclusion.

But then how helpful are these 8 submarines to Australia? I would argue that it actually gives them more trouble than pleasure. Why? Because Australia has no nuclear industry. And because of these eight nuclear summaries, they have to develop the industry from scratch, and these nuclear summaries have to be built elsewhere. Then, about nuclear submarines, the maintenance would be a big issue. No ships need to be maintained. And for nuclear submarines, these ships have to be sent somewhere for maintenance. So all these kind things would actually give them a lot of trouble. And besides, basically, I believe this kind of effort is because the Australia was sweet talked, therefore is actually subsidizing American military which doesn't have enough ships or manpower in this region.

Historic speaking, the irony is, Australia always fought other people's war, because they do not have wars of its own, be it Gallipoli, Vietnam or Afghanistan, they always fought others people’s war and they never think really hard about how to strike a balance. But now I think, strategically speaking, they would really feel the constant agony because they're just located in this region. And to see China growing ever stronger, I think a lot of people would think whether this right decision or not, to just gang up with United States so blindly, because this decision was made in a very rash manner, it's not fully consulted and a lot of people spoke against it, be it PM Paul Keating or PM Turnbull, they all talked against it.

The Spectator: So in relation to Taiwan then, because as you say, it is all about China and it is about the Taiwan Strait. How does AUKUS change China's calculations about what to do with Taiwan?

Zhou Bo: AUKUS would certainly complicated Beijing's decision making, but it's not a game changer. It's just as simple as that. Well, think of the eight nuclear power submarines. When could they be produced and when can they be deployed and when can they become operational? It is at least 10 years away. And in the beginning, people basically talk about the first submarine be deployed before 2040. Okay, even in 10 years' time, let me ask you, how strong would then PLA Navy become? Okay, let's talk about submarine. In terms of submarine, PLA has more submarines than even in the United States. Of course, there is a question of quality. And most of the submarines, they’re conventional submarine, but quantity has its own quality, numbers also matter. And Chinese ships are also being improved with quality tremendously. So in 10 years time, how strong would PLA Navy become? Then, how would these eight submarines really matter for us? As I said before, it may just complicate our decision making because we have to take them into account, but that is not a game change.

The Spectator: Zhou Bo, thank you so much.

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