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【觀察者網按】烏克蘭紛亂繼續，西方各國騎虎難下，普京在記者會上從容表態、躊躇滿志，奧巴馬政府卻只能依靠一味提高調門來維持均衡。但一些美國有識之士開始認真考慮情況。愛荷華州前議員Greg Cusack希望通過Shanghai Daily和觀察者網來表達他被奧巴馬忽視的意見。作為老一代statesman，Cusack能秉承傳統政治實用主義倫理——在必須認輸的情況下就認真認輸，不拘泥于抽象意識形態。當意識到普京一手好牌，他表示應該理解俄羅斯的做法，尤其回顧歷史，俄羅斯被北約欺騙是事實。美國人有門羅主義，為什么俄羅斯不能考慮自己的核心利益。政治不能依靠極端手段，只能依靠艱苦具體的努力。

我們當然知道美國政客不是每時每刻都會想起公道。他要提醒的是，在劣勢情況下還要堅持騎虎不下是非常不對的。他最后談到中國政府態度不明確，呼吁中國政府擔當“真誠的調停者”。但我們相信Cusack先生一定能夠理解，正如他所說的，非此即彼的“明確”態度并不能解決問題，要相信中國政府通過艱苦努力和智慧博弈來推動世界和平與發展的能力。本文由《上海日報》獨家合作英文供稿。

【全文】俄羅斯軍隊開進克里米亞，使近幾周來持續緊張的烏克蘭局勢趨于白熱化。可以預見，震怒的美國右翼政客們紛紛指責奧巴馬總統在克里米亞問題上過于“軟弱”。在這個問題上，我個人的看法比較復雜。一方面，我認為俄羅斯總統普京做出進軍克里米亞的決定，激化了當地緊張局勢，帶來了不必要的風險；另一方面，我能夠理解俄羅斯的立場——烏克蘭局勢近來不斷升級，確實超出了憲法的約束。

就在數周前，在俄羅斯與歐洲多國代表的共同斡旋下，尚未被解除總統職務的亞努科維奇與反對派代表達成了分層協議（俄羅斯早先就已對烏克蘭反對派隊伍中極右翼民族主義勢力表達過關切，認為他們完全無法代表烏東部和南部地區人民的意愿）。基輔協議允許亞努科維奇在接受多項改革措施的前提下繼續掌權，但必須在2014年年底前舉行總統大選。僅僅幾日后，該項協議便成為一紙空文，亞努科維奇逃離首都。然而，背棄協議的不是亞努科維奇，這一點我們必須搞清楚。

俄羅斯總統普京宣稱，發生在烏克蘭的事件是一場違憲政變，是“暴民統治”，議會罷黜亞努科維奇缺少合法性。與此同時，烏克蘭東部和南部地區大批公民請求俄羅斯支援，與武力篡權者抗衡。

3月4日，普京在記者招待會上稱烏克蘭事件系違憲政變。

不幸的是，西方國家非但沒有與普京一起呼吁各方重新回到談判桌上，反而迫不及待地認定了亞努科維奇的免職，并承認了烏克蘭新政府的合法性。如果違反基輔協議的是亞努科維奇，西方的反應想必大不相同。在批評俄羅斯入侵別國有違國際法的同時，美國何不反省自身當初在伊拉克和阿富汗的侵略行徑？西方政客如此虛偽，普京怎能不嗤之以鼻？

俄羅斯是否應當懷疑西方的目的？

在國際事務中，歷史的記憶是長久的，影響是深遠的。小問題不解決好總會出大亂子。我并非為普京辯護，但從俄羅斯的立場出發，烏克蘭事件是美國和其他西方國家無視或輕視俄羅斯利益的又一例證。

1991年蘇聯解體后，俄羅斯領導人們本以為獲得了北約不向蘇聯加盟共和國擴張的許諾。可就在2009年，時任俄羅斯總統的梅德韋杰夫憤怒地指責西方背棄承諾。雖然梅氏對往事的回憶在細節上不一定完全準確，但一些關鍵性的歷史參與者們表示，西方確實對俄羅斯做出過這樣的承諾。（參見《明鏡周刊》2009年11月26日刊文“北約東擴：西方是否背棄了對莫斯科的承諾”）

此外，當美國公布東歐反導計劃時，俄羅斯明確表示反對，因為俄認為美國部署在波蘭的反導導彈雖是為了攔截伊朗可能發射的帶核彈頭的彈道導彈，但也可能被用以針對俄羅斯的導彈力量。美國雖然表示理解俄羅斯的擔心，但既沒有與俄羅斯共同研究新方案，也沒有取消部署計劃。

歷史的現實與俄羅斯的記憶

一千多年前，當東斯拉夫人建立起俄羅斯的前身——基輔羅斯的時候，烏克蘭民族便與俄羅斯民族結下了愛恨交織的深厚淵源。當今烏克蘭國土的很大一部分，是羅斯人的故園。16、17世紀時，烏克蘭的東西部之間已經出現了巨大的文化差異——西部親歐、東部親俄。1922年，烏克蘭蘇維埃社會主義共和國加盟蘇聯。在第二次世界大戰中，許多烏克蘭民族主義者不顧一切地爭取民族獨立，既抗擊納粹又與蘇軍作戰。1945年，烏克蘭人爭取獨立的斗爭終告失敗，烏克蘭蘇維埃社會主義共和國成為聯合國創始成員國之一。直到1991年蘇聯解體后，烏克蘭才獲取獨立。

二戰結束后，斯大林最關心的事，是促使周邊盟國依附于俄羅斯，確保它們不再成為歐洲國家侵俄（法國1812年、德國1941年）的跳板。冷戰揭幕時，西方國家對蘇聯附屬國政權的專制性質充滿警惕，已全然忘記蘇俄需要友好鄰邦的根本原因。

事實上，在烏克蘭問題上，俄羅斯有理由比美國表現得更加積極。其他國家應該對美國于1823年提出的門羅主義記憶猶新，時任總統的門羅相當于對全世界下了禁令，宣布其他國家不得干涉整個西半球的事務。隨著經濟和軍事實力的增強，美國在維護勢力范圍內的友盟關系時，變得越來越具有攻擊性。上世紀六十年代初，由于古巴導彈危機，美國和蘇聯之間幾乎爆發核戰爭；七十年代，美國扶植尼加拉瓜反動派打擊桑地諾民族解放陣線的革命斗爭。我想說明的是，美國過去違反國際法的行徑，固然不能成為其他國家今天的借口，但美國外交人員如能以史為鑒，應能更智慧和謙卑地處理當今的外交事務。

結語

對烏克蘭來說，什么樣的結局才是最好的？我不敢妄言，但我們應該為對峙雙方的克制感到慶幸，至少沒有爆發大規模流血沖突。相關各方都應得到贊賞。未來，西方國家應當盡所有可能，讓俄羅斯確信西方將尊重并支持烏克蘭與俄羅斯的特殊關系；同時也要讓烏克蘭當局明白這一點。這不應是一場俄羅斯與西方之間非此即彼的角力。相關各方都應維護烏克蘭文化與歷史的多樣性，包括俄羅斯在內的大歐羅巴地區更應理解這一點。

但是，烏克蘭政治已經到了不得不改變的地步。烏克蘭未來的政治結構或許可以參考聯邦制，允許各地區獲得更大的自治權和代表權。不過，如果克里米亞人民真的投票決定脫烏入俄，烏克蘭當局除了被迫接受和武裝干預外，也沒有更多選擇的余地。

我不知道什么是最明智的選擇，但我確信一點：使用暴力絕對得不到令人滿意的結果。只有在相互尊重、相互理解的基礎上，通過艱苦漫長的談判，追求共同利益，才有希望打破彼此敵視、怨恨、指責的惡性循環。只有相關各方真誠合作，才能促使烏克蘭與俄羅斯拿出符合雙方利益的解決方案。

我注意到，中國政府對俄羅斯的行動既未表示支持，也未明確反對，而是呼吁各方保持克制、進行磋商。烏克蘭需要一個“真誠的調停者”，或許中國可以扮演這個角色。這是世界大國偶爾必須承擔的沉重包袱之一。

（英文原文見《上海日報》（Shanghai Daily）2014年3月7日。作者Greg Cusack曾做過歷史和政治學教師，美國國家天主教鄉村生活會主任；曾任愛荷華州眾議院議員，已于2004年退出公共服務領域。本文由觀察者網楊晗軼翻譯。）

The Ukraine Situation: One American’s Perspective

Greg Cusack

The turmoil in Ukraine in recent weeks, heightened by Russia’s dispatching of military forces to Crimea, has prompted predictable cries of outrage from right-wing American politicians accusing U.S. President Obama of “weakness” for not responding more forcefully. My own reaction is decidedly more mixed. While I think Russian President Putin’s decision to send forces into Crimea increased tensions and introduced unnecessary risks, I also share the Russian perspective that recent developments in the Ukraine appear to be outside the law.

Just a couple of weeks ago, Russia participated with other European representatives in brokering a layered agreement between representatives of protestors in Kyiv and Ukraine’s president, Mr. Yanukovich. (Russia had for some time been expressing its concern that many of the street protestors represented far-right nationalists who in no way represented the sentiments of the peoples of eastern and southern Ukraine.) This agreement allowed Mr. Yanukovich to remain in power, but also contained many reform measures, including holding an election for the presidency before 2014 ended. Only a few days later, however, this arrangement collapsed and the president fled the capital. It is important to remember that it was not Mr. Yanukovich who reneged on the agreement.

Russian President Mr. Putin alleges that this was clearly an instance of “mob rule,” and that the subsequent deposition of Mr. Yanukovich lacked legal standing. Concurrently, many citizens of the eastern and southern portions of Ukraine began calling for Russian assistance to counter this usurpation of power.

Unfortunately, rather than joining Mr. Putin in calling for a return to the terms of the brokered agreement, Western nations welcomed the turn of events by acknowledging the legitimacy of the new government in Kiev and the deposition of Mr. Yanukovich. I suspect that if it had been President Yanukovich who had broken the agreement, the West’s reaction would have been quite different. This, coupled with America’s lecturing Russia about violating international law by invading another country – despite America’s invasions and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – had to have struck Mr. Putin as the height of hypocrisy.

Does Russia Have Cause to be Suspicious of Western Intentions?

In international affairs, memories are long and perceived, unresolved slights can fester. One does not have to be a defender of Mr. Putin to understand that – from Russia’s point of view – this incident is yet another instance where the United States and other Western powers have behaved as if Russia’s concerns were, at best, of secondary importance.

Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, Russian leaders believe they received what they thought was a firm promise that NATO would not expand eastward to welcome as member states former members of the Soviet Union. As recently as 2009, former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev angrily repeated the charge that the West had broken its promise. While Mr. Medvedev’s recollection of events may not be correct in every detail, some of the key players involved at the time thought that, indeed, just such a promise had been made. [See “NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Did the West Break Its Promise to Moscow,” Der Spiegel, November 26, 2009.]

Furthermore, when the United States announced that it would station in Poland missiles capable of intercepting any warheads that might be launched from Iran, Russia objected that this system could also be used against Russia’s missile force. While the United States acknowledged this concern, it neither partnered with Russia for an alternative solution nor cancelled its deployment plans.

Historical Realities and Russian Memories

The Ukrainian and Russian peoples’ cultural and historical ties are complex, having begun over a thousand years ago with a grouping of Slavic peoples organized as the Kievan Rus’, the precursor to the nation of Russia. A good part of what is modern Ukraine was this peoples’ homeland. By the 16th and 17th centuries, however, the cultural divide between the western portion of Ukraine – seeking closer ties with the West – and the eastern and southern portions – with historically closer ties to Russia – had already developed. Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union in 1922 as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During the chaos of the Second World War, many Ukrainians fought against both the Nazis and the Soviets in a desperate struggle for national independence. In 1945, those efforts having failed, the Ukrainian SSR was one of the founding members of the United Nations; it remained part of the Soviet Union until the latter’s dissolution in 1991.

One of Stalin’s key concerns following WW II was to make certain that neighboring countries through which the West had twice invaded Russia – France in 1812 and Germany in 1941 – were dependably allied with Russia. While the autocratic nature of these states caused alarm in the West and led to the onset of the period known as the Cold War, the West has apparently forgotten why Russia wants reliably friendly neighboring states.

In truth, why should Russia be any more passive in this respect than the United States? Other nations certainly remember the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, when the American president essentially told the rest of the world to keep its hands off the entire Western Hemisphere. And, as the United States gained in economic and military power, it became even more aggressive in asserting its right to ensure that countries in its hemisphere were friendly to it. As recently as the early 1960s the U.S. and Russia came to the brink of nuclear war because of Russian missiles in Cuba and, in the 1970s America funded the Contra forces warring against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. My point here is not that past American violations of international law warrant similar behavior by other states today but, rather, that knowledge of our past ought to infuse America’s diplomatic efforts with greater wisdom and a generous heaping of humility.

Conclusion

What is the best outcome we can hope for in Ukraine? Well, for one thing, we can all celebrate the remarkable fact that, so far at least, this has been a bloodless confrontation. Praise to all involved! Moving forward, the West should take every opportunity to reassure Russia – and remind Ukraine’s leadership – that the West respects and supports Ukraine’s special relationship with Russia. This should not be an “either/or” tug of war between Russia and the West. There is every reason for all parties involved to celebrate the many diverse cultures and their histories in Ukraine. Greater Europe (including Russia) is richer for it.

But there may have to be some political changes. For instance, Ukraine could adopt a more federal structure, allowing greater autonomy of, and representation to, its various regions. Doing so might lesson the otherwise secessionist impulses of many in the eastern and southern portions of the Ukraine. Nonetheless, if the citizens of Crimea, for instance, vote to secede from Ukraine and petition to be annexed by Russia, the Ukrainian leadership may well have to choose between swallowing hard and allowing it, or initiating military force to attempt to stop it.

I do not pretend to know what the wisest option might be. Of this I am certain, however: Violence is never a satisfactory answer. Only the slow, laborious process of seeking mutual respect, understanding, and the pursuit of collective self-interest holds the promise of breaking the cycle of rivalry, anger and recrimination. And this process can best be facilitated if all parties would truly work for solutions that would best honor the interests of both Ukraine and Russia.

I have noticed that China’s government, while neither endorsing nor condemning Russia’s actions, has called for restraint and consultation on all sides. Perhaps China could offer her services as just the kind of “honest broker” this situation needs. This is one of the heavy burdens that nations with world power status must occasionally assume.